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STATEMENT OF CASE
On January 9, 2006, the Respondent, City of Lewiston passed Ordinance 4398. The
ordinance provided for new regulations for rna~~ufactured
home parlts within the City of
1,ewiston. A copy of Ordinance 4398 is set forth in full at R, p. 105 - 124 for the Court's
review. Section 32- 14 of that ordinance provides for standards for manufactured home
parks. Recreational vehicles are no longer allowed in manufactured home parks within the
city. Recreational vehicles placed in manufactured home parks as of January 9, 2006, are
allowed to continue. No recreational vehicles are allowed to be placed in manufactured
home parks after the effective date of the ordinailce. Also, when a pre-existing recreational
vehicle is removed from a manufactured home park it must be replaced with a unit
conforming to the standards of Ordinance 4398.
The Appellant, Steven Lee Eddins, owns a manufactured home park at 727 281h
Street. Lewiston, Idaho. As of January 9. 2006, the park had a mix of mai~ufacturedhomes
and recreational vehicles. Someti~neprior to January 22, 2008, the Appellant applied for a
City of 1,ewiston perrnit to place a recreational vehicle in the park located at 727 8"' Street,
Lewiston, Idaho. The city issues permits for placement of manufactured homes to insure
utility hookups are done properly and to insure compliance with zoning ordinances.
On January 23.2008, John Murray of the Lewiston Community Development
Department, wrote a letter (R, p. 9-1 0) to the Appellant, informing him of the city's decision
to deny the permit stating:
"New regulations no longer allow the placement of recreational vehicles
in manufactured home parks. All new units or any unit change-outs placed
within your park(s) must meet the manufactured home construction and
safety standards of the Department of Housing and Urban Development . . ."
(R, p. 9).
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The Appellant appealed the decision of the Community Development Depastlnent to
the Lewiston Planning and Zoning Commission. The Planning and Zoning Conlrnission
heard the appeal on March 12, 2008, and issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decision dated March 3 1, 2008 (R, p. 32-34). 'The Appellant then appealed to the Lewiston
City Council. On April 28, 2008, the Lewiston City Council upheld the decision of the
Lewiston Planning and Zoning Commission (R, p. 78). The Appellant then filed with
District Court below his Petition for Judicial lieviecv of the city's decision denying a permit
for the re-placement of the recreational vehicle in his manufactured home park. The District
Judge below, Jeff M. Brudie, ruled the city. "afier considerable disc~~ssion."
that removal of
recreational vehicles from manufactured home parks was done "for a number of safety
reasons" (R. p. 129). Further, he ruled that the Appellant failed to demonstrate how the
Respondent's decision exceeded its authority. was based on unlawf~ilprocedure, was
arbitrary. capricious, or an abuse of discretion (R, p. 120-130).

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

DID APPELLANT'S ELIMINATION OF NON-CONFORMING;, PRE-EXISTING
USE TERMINATE HIS RIGHT TO CONTINUE THE NON-CONFORMING, PREEXISTING USE?

2.

HAS THE APPELLANT DEMONSTRATED PREJUDICE OF A SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHT?

ARGUMENT
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to a long line of Idaho Supreme Court cases articulated in Evans v. Teton

County, 1 39 Idaho 7 1, 73 P.3d 84 (2003) and Urrutia, et nl v. Blaine County, 1 34 Idaho 3 53,
2 P.3d 738, (2000) dealing with the review of local agency decisions in local land use
planning issues, the reviewing court is limited to the authority granted in the Idaho

Respondent's Brief

6

Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 52. 'l'itle 67. I(lltlio Cotle. See also Comer v.
County of Twirz fills, 130 Idaho 433, 437. 942 P.2d 557, 56 1 (1 997). The reviewing court

does not substitute its judgmeilt for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidei~ce
presented. Ictnlto Code 67-5279(1). The revielying court defers to the local agency's findings
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. See also Soutlz Fork Coalition v. Board of
Commissioner ofBonneville County. 1 17 Idaho 857, 860, 792 P.2d 882, 885 (1 990). The

City of Lewiston's decision is binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting
evidence, as long as the decision is supported by competent evidence in the record. This
Court may overturn the decision of the city only if it (a) violates statutory or constitutional
provisions: (b) exceeds the city's statutory authority; (c) is made upon an inl lawful
procedure; (d) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record: or (e) is arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Idaho Code 67-5279(3). Cities are authorized by Idaho
Code to make all sucl~ordinances, bylaws. rules, regulations and resolutions not inconsistent
with the laws of the state of Idaho as may be expedient, in addition to the special powers in
this act granted, to maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the corporation,
Icfnlzo Code 50-302. The LocaI Land Use Planning Act also authorizes cities in Idaho to

adopt ordinances and regulations that promote the health, safety, and general welfare of its
citizens, Idaho Code 67-6502. Further, there is a strong presumption of the validity of city
ordinances and city actions interpreting its ordinances. Lamar Corp v. City of Twin Falls,

133 Idaho 36, 981 P.2d 1 146 (1 999), Young Electric Sign Co. v. Strrte. 135 Idaho 804,25
P.3d 1 17 (2001), CNC V. City of Boise, 137 Idaho 377,48 P.3d 1266 (2002). The burden of
proof is on the party attacking the city's decision.

The Appellant in this case must show the

city erred in one of the enumerated areas listed in Idalto Code 67-5279(3) and that a
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srlbstantial right of the Appellant has been prejudiced. See also Price v. Pnyette Courzty, 13 1
Idaho 426, 429,958 P.2d 583. 587 (1 998).

B.

DID APPELLANT'S E121MINA'lION OF NON-CONFORMING, IXREEXIS'SING USE TERMINATE HlS RIGHT TO CONTINIJE THE NONCONFORMING, PRE-EXISTPNG IJSE?
In 2006 the city adopted Ordinance 4398. This ordinance does not allow the

place~nentof recreational vehicles in manufactured home parks. Prior to the ordinance's
passage, the Appellant has a number of recreational vehicles in his manufactured home park.
The Appellant asserts he has a "grandfathered" right to continue to have those recreational
vehicles in his manufactured home park even though a 2006 city ordinance prohibits the
placement of recreational vehicles in a manufactured home park. The Respondent does not
deny this "grandfathered' right. All recreational vellicles actually in tile lnan~~factured
home
park on the effective date of the ordinance may contiilue to remain in the park. The
Appellant f~~i-ther
asserts his "grandfathered" right includes the right to replace old,
abandoned, or moved recreational vehicles with other recreational vehicles. It is the
Respondent's position that the Appellant's "grandfathered" right does not give him that right.
All placements or re-placements of units in the park after the effective date of the 2006
ordinance must coinply with the standards of the 2006 ordinance.
The Appellant has cited a number of Idaho appellate cases that protect a nonconforming, pre-existing use. One of these cases is O'Connor v. Cify of Moscow, 6 9 Idaho
37,202 P.2d 401 (1 949). It is the first case in Idaho to recognize the protected right to
continue a non-conforming, pre-existing use. It is clear from this language the right is not
absolute, but a limited one.
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We are not unmindful that zoning ordinances conten~platethe gradual
elimination of non-conforming uses within the zoned area and such
elimination may be accomplished as speedily as possible with due regard
to the special interests of those concerned; . . . the accepted method of
accomplishing the result has been said to be that the non-conformity, in no
case. will be allowed to increase but will be permitted to corztinue ziniil
some change in the premises or in the use thereof is contemplated by the
owner. . . (emphasis added) O'Connor, page 42.
Other cases. cited by the Appellant, contain the following language that hi-ther
clarify the limited nature of "grandfather" protection
This 'grandfather right" simply protects the owner from the a b r y t
termination of what had been a lawful condition or activity on the
property. 'The protection does not extend beyond this purpose. (emphasis
added) Bnxter v. City ofPreston, 1 15 Idaho 607 at 609,768 P.2d 1340
(1 989); Glengary-Ganzliul Protective Ass 'n v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84 at 90,
675 P.2d 344 (App. 1983); Bastion v. City of Twirt Falls, 104 Idaho 307
at 309,658 P.2d 978 (App. 1983)
The Bnstia~zcourt further held:
Thus, nonconforming status is not a talisman from which all zoning
controls must retreat, Rather, public policy embodied in zoning laws
dictates the firm regulation of no~iconforminguses with a view to their
eventual elimination. Bnstian, supra, at 309
All tliese cases anticipate the elimination of nun-conforming, pre-existing uses if the
local zoning ordinance provides for such elimination. The City of Lewiston considers
permanent living in a recreational vehicle a matter of safety; see R, p. 45, for discussion by
Planning and Zoning Commissioner Sue Brown on safety. The Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission also specifically
cite safety as the reason for the gradual elimination of recreation vehicles from manufactured
home parks; see R, p. 33, Finding number 9 and Conclusion number 4. Chapter 3 of Title 50
and Chapter 65 of Title 67 of the lrnnlzo Code expressly authorize cities to adopt ordinances
for public safety and welfare. In reviewing this case the Court does not substitute its
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r.

judgrrier1t for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. I he reviewing
court defers to the local agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. The
Respondent City bas determined long term living it1 a recreational vehicle is something to be
discouraged and eventually eliminated. Nothing in the record suggests that this decision is
not a reasonable coilclusion or a valid exercise of the city's police power.
Consistent with O'Connor the Respondent's Ordinance 4398 recognizes the
Appellant's non-conforming, pre-existing use. Following the standard of Brtuter, GlengnryG'nurtlir~and Bnstin~zOrdillance 4398 does not require the "abrupt termination" of a nonconforming: pre-existing use. Also consistent with O'Corznor and Bnstictn, Ordinance 4398
allows the owner. not the city, to trigger the elimination of the owner's non-conforming, preexisting use. When the owner or the owner's tenant initiates a change in the premises and
chooses to remove a recreational vehicle for reasons of age. non-use, tenant preference. or
relocation of a tenant, the "grandfathered" right is terminated and any placement of a new
unit must conforln with the standards of the 2006 ordinance

C.

HAS THE APPELLANT DEMONSTRATED PREJUDICE OF A

"SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT"?
To prevail in this appeal, the Appellant needs to demonstrate prejudice of a
substantial right by the Respondent's decision.
Finally, even if the Board's decision had not been based on substantial
evidence or was otherwise invalid under I.C. $ 67-5279(3), I.C. $ 675279(4) states that "notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2) and
(3) of this section, agency action shall be afiirmed unless substantial right
of the appellant have been prejudiced." Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147
Idaho 267, at 276,207 P.3d 998 (2009).
Clearly, a property owner's right to develop real property in some manner is a
substantial right, Noble v. Kbotenni County, Docket No. 3 520 1 (Idaho 4- 1-2010). However,
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in the FVoftrfecase cited above, a property owner had applied for a variance to build within
the setback area. The court held 'kven with the denial of the variance requests, Respondents
are still able to use their property as permitted under state law and regulations and county
ordinances." Worl~le,supra, at 276. In A~zgst~zan
v. City ofBoise, 128 Idaho 575, 9 17 P.2d
409 (App. 1996) the Court ruled the appellant's substantial rights were not violated when a
Boise City Council interpretation of a city ordinance resulted in the appellant's project being
reduced from 40 units to 33 units. This Court opiued in Johnson v. Bfnirze County. 146
Idaho 91 6 at 929, 204 P.2d 1 127 (2009) "it is questionable whether petitioner's substantial
rights are affected by the county's approval of unit pricing policies, or waiving setback
requirements in this instance.
In the case before the Court, the Respondent has not denied the Appellant the use or
development rights to his real property. The Appellant is free to operate his inanufactured
home park in much the same manner as the park has been operated in the past, with a mixture
of manufactured homes and recreational vehicles.
Lastly, the Appellant asserts if the Appellant is not allow to contirlue his nonconforming, pre-existing use it would be a violation of due process protections afforded by
the Idaho Constitution. The Respondent recognizes a inverse condemnation claim has not
been made nor is it appropriate in this proceeding; however, Coviizgtorz v. Jefleuson County,
137 Idaho 777,53 P.3d 828 (2002) is instructive on how the Idaho Supreme Court views
zoning regulations, property values and due process. In Covirzgton, the owners of real
property near a landfill, operating pursuant to a conditional use permit granted by Jefferson
County, claimed the landfill diminished the value of their property. 'The owners estimated a
25% diminishment in value. The Idaho Supreme Court said:
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The Covingtons also claim a taking has occurred due to the diminution in
value of approximately one-fourth the appraised value of their property, as
a result of the zoning ordinance authorizing the operation of the landfill
'I'his does not constitute a taking where residual value remains. ""A zoning
ordinar-rce that downgrades the econolnic value of private property does
not necessarily constitute a taking by the goverment, especially if some
residual value remains after the enactment of the ordinance." (Quoting
McCuslcey v. Canyon G'aurtty Colnm'rs, 128 Idaho 2 13, at 2 16,9 12 P.2d
100 (1 996)). Covington, supra. at 78 1.

The circumstances in this case indicate the property retained residual value
despite any reduction in value that inay have been cause by Jefferson
County"~
action and. therefore, no coinpensable taking has occurred.
Covirzgkon, supra, at 78 1 .
I11

the matter before the Court, the Appellant is asking that he be allowed to continue

to rent recreational vehicle spaces after a "grandfathered" recreational vehicle is moved out
because the space will not accommodate a Class A or Class B manufacture home. This
argument fails to consider a future reconfiguration of the manufactured home park, but,
nevertheless, any diminution

ill

value is not a violation of due process since the other

manufactured home sites remain available, the property retains income prod~tcingpotential
and the Appellant continues ownership and development rights in the property

CONCLUSION
This Court may overturn the decision of the city only if it (a) violates statutory or
constitutional provisions; (b) exceeds the city's statutory authority; (c) is made upon an
unlawful procedure; (d) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) is
arbitrary, capriciorrs, or an abuse of discretion. Iclnlzo Code 67-5279(3). There is no evidence
in the record that would show the Appellant has met his burden in this case. City of
Lewiston Ordinance 4398 is a valid exercise of police power and zoning authority. The
ordinance follows all the guidelines pronounced by the Idaho Appellate Courts. It recognizes
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a legiiil-iiate t~orl-conformiiig,pre-existing use. Pursuant to case law. the ordinance provides
for the eventual elimination of the non-conforming, pre-existing use by the action of the
property owner, not the local government. The Respondent's decision to deny a permit for
placement of the recreational vehicle in a matlufactured home park and the decision of the
District Court below, should be affirmed.
8 -
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DATED this

day of June, 20 10.

Don L. Roberts
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFCATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that on June L,2, 2010, a true and correct copy (two copies) of the
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at Clark and Feeney, 13"' and Main Street, Suite 201. Lewiston, Idaho.

DATED this
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day of June, 20 10.

Don L. Roberts \\
Attorney for the gespondent
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